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Executive summary 
This study investigates whether firms following a prospector strategy are less likely to adopt 
residual income (RI) as their main performance measure than firms following a defender strategy. 
The rationale behind this research question is that previous research has shown that implementing 
RI-based incentives has some behavioral consequences that intuitively do not rhyme well with the 
objectives of a growing firm. The sample consists of 40 RI adopters, matched with 40 non-adopters, 
for each of which strategy is measured as a combination of three publicly available ratios. 
Although the empirical results of this study are inconclusive, he research has lead to renewed 
insights that should be of use to researchers in the future. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Residual income is a performance measure that has received a lot of attention in the past 
fifteen years. It is claimed to overcome the problems associated with traditional 
performance measures. These problems include (investment and operational) myopia and 
paying too little attention to the costs of capital involved to generate earnings. 
RI is calculated by removing from operating income a charge on employed capital. What 
remains is, according to proponents of RI-type of measures, the true value a firm has 
created. That is, the value it creates beyond the demanded cost of capital. Under this 
definition, RI can be used by any for-profit company, at any time, as it is simply the 
measure that best encompasses all the different aspects of value creation: finance, 
investments and operations (Bouwens and Speklé 2007). 
The most prominent assumption underlying the discussion in favor of RI, is that it is (most) 
closely aligned with stockholder value. One can therefore take in the advantages of a 
market-based measure, whilst leaving the disadvantages of uncontrollability and distortion 
aside. Various researchers, however, have concluded that RI does not explain stock returns 
as well as claimed (Biddle et al. 1997). 
Reluctant to believe RI thereby loses all of it’s benefits, I seek to find out why, then, firms 
apparently still decide to embrace this measure as their primary basis for incentive 
                                             
31 This thesis was supervised by Dr. J. Noeverman, Department of Accounting, Auditing & Control, Rotterdam 
School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam.  
Frank Sonneveld has graduated in Economics and Business at the Erasmus University Rotterdam (NL) and is now 
doing a second master programme in Banking and Finance at the University of Sankt Gallen (CH). 
 161
compensation. The answer to this question, I believe, lies in the behavioral consequences 
of adopting an RI-based performance measure. According to Wallace (1997), firms that 
adopt RI-based compensation increase their RI performance in the years following RI 
adoption, thereby confirming the adage ‘what you measure is what you get’. Firms do this 
by (1) decreasing investments, (2) increasing divestments, (3) increase payouts to 
shareholders, and (4) increase asset turnover. These results indicate the evolvement of 
more asset-conscious behavior when RI is adopted. 
The next step in my line of reasoning is the hypothesized notion that the choice to adopt 
RI is an endogenous one. That is: some firms are more likely to adopt RI-based measures 
than others. Considering the behavioral consequences of RI adoption as Wallace (1997) 
found them, I argue firms following a defender-type of strategy are more likely to adopt RI 
than are firms following a prospector-type of strategy. 
This argument molded into a research question looks as follows: 
 
Are firms characterized as following a defender-type strategy more likely to adopt 
residual income-based performance incentives than firms characterized as following a 
prospector-type strategy? 
 
I deliberately use the strategy typology defined by Miles and Snow (Miles et al. 1978), 
because of it’s widespread use among researchers and because it is well documented 
(Simons 1987). 
In my research, I create a strategy continuum ranging from defender to prospector. This 
method is appropriated from Ittner et al. (1997) and involves the measurement of three 
publicly available ratios which are then modified to weigh equally and compounded into 
one strategy measure. These ratios are: (1) research and development (R&D) expenditures-
to-sales, (2) market-to-book-assets, and (3) employees-to-sales. 
My sample consists of 40 firms that have adopted RI as their primary measure for incentive 
compensation in the last 13 years, matched with 40 control firms, identified through 
matching on standard industry classification (SIC) codes and total assets (to proxy for firm 
size). The result is a sample of 80 firms (40 firm couples). For availability reasons, I chose 
to investigate stock listed U.S. companies only. 
With this research I aim to make a valuable contribution to existing incentive 
compensation literature because research on the endogenous character of RI adoption is 
scarce. Although corporate strategy has for long been linked to management control 
systems (Otley 1980), it has rarely been applied to RI-based performance measurement 
systems. A confirming answer to my research question could lead the way for other 
researchers to examine whether RI adopting firms following a defender strategy (and thus 
match the profile of an RI adopter) perform better than firms adopting RI whilst following 
a prospector strategy. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the second part will provide summary of 
relevant prior literature. This will be extended in part three where I will present my 
hypothesis development. In part four I will set out how I designed my research. The results 
are then presented in part five, and analyzed in part six. This part will also contain a 
summary of the paper. 
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2.  Prior research 
 
2.1  Performance based compensation 
Performance based compensation finds it’s origin in agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989). 
Agency relationships arise because firms grow and are thereby forced to decentralize 
decision-making authorities (Jensen and Meckling 1992; Bouwens and Speklé 2007). 
Performance based compensation aims to re-align the interests of managers and their 
superiors. 
The ultimate goal for any for-profit organization is to maximize shareholder (or firm) 
value. It would therefore seem logical to reward employees when they create value for the 
firm. However, since measuring one’s contribution to firm value is rarely possible, 
alternative ways of rewarding employees have to be sought (Merchant and Van der Stede 
2007). 
Generally accepted finance literature states the value of any economic asset can be 
calculated by discounting all future cash flows the asset is expected to generate to present 
value (Berk and Demarzo 2007). The change in firm value over a certain period of time is 
called economic income. Building on the principle of discounted future cash flows, 
employees can create value for the firm by: (1) increasing the size of future cash flows, (2) 
accelerating the receipt of those cash flows (due to the time value of money), or (3) 
making the cash flows less susceptible to risk (to lower the discount rate) (Merchant and 
Van der Stede 2007). 
Seeing as managerial tasks are broad and varied, the list of possible performance measures 
on the basis of which managers can be evaluated and rewarded is extensive. Following 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2007), I classify these measures to fit into one of two broad 
categories: market measures and accounting measures. Measures in each of these two 
categories have their individual advantages and disadvantages. Regardless of what certain 
consulting firms might argue, there is no such thing as a perfect performance measure. 
 
2.2  Market- and accounting-based performance measures 
The first type of measure we discuss are those that are market-based. These measures are 
based on the direct value created for shareholders, also referred to as shareholder return. 
Shareholder return is calculated as the sum of dividends plus the change in stock price 
(Berk and Demarzo 2007). 
The popularity of stock-based compensation systems lies in the directness by which they 
relate to changes in shareholder value. Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) furthermore 
identify market measures of performance as being timely, precise and nearly impossible to 
manipulate. 
Of course there are also disadvantages to using market measures of performance. The 
biggest of which lies in the numerous amount of uncontrollable factors that influence stock 
prices. Additionally, it is generally only top management that can significantly influence 
stock prices as stock prices contain aggregated information from a whole organization. 
Accounting measures of performance have traditionally been the primary base for manager 
evaluations (Van der Stede et al. 2006). Two basic forms of accounting based measures are 
distinguished by Merchant and Van der Stede (2007): (1) residual measures such as 
operating profit or RI, and (2) ratio measures such as return on assets (ROA) or return on 
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investment (ROI). I will be giving ROI special attention as it is, in characteristics, closest to 
RI. 
Accounting measures of performance thank their popularity to a number of advantages 
which I will appropriate primarily from Merchant and Van der Stede (2007). First of all they 
are generally relatively congruent with the organization’s goal of value (profit) 
maximization (Lev 1989). Nonetheless, accounting measures of performance are subject to 
some of the same controllability issues as market measures. A big difference between the 
two types of measures, however, is that accounting measures can be calculated for 
individual business units lower down the organization, whereas stock prices are usually 
only available for corporations as a whole. 
Using accounting profits or any other accounting based performance measure, however, 
has its disadvantages as well. The most heard critique on accounting measures is that they 
focus on the past. They are said to be backward-looking (Kaplan and Norton 1992). The 
problem associated with this characteristic is that managers are not motivated to think 
proactively. 
 
2.3  Return-on-investment 
The one accounting measure I will address individually is ROI, because I consider it to be 
closest related to residual income – the measure this paper is about. ROI is a popular 
measure because it allows comparing of divisions of different sizes. A larger division is 
supposed to make more profit than a smaller division. Because ROI divides profit by total 
investments for the particular divisions, it controls for division size. 
Other advantages are that ROI clearly reflects the revenue, cost and investment tradeoff 
managers have to make and the experience most managers have with widely-used 
measures like this (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007). 
There are, however, important disadvantages to using ROI as a performance measure as 
well. The first disadvantage lies in the inherent difference between ratio and absolute 
measures. This is explained nicely by Balachandran (2006), who mentions maximizing a 
ratio measure can induce suboptimal investment behavior. A successful division manager 
might be reluctant to invest in a project that would lower his division’s ROI, even though 
the project ROI is higher than the company’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
Conversely, a manager of a less successful division may choose to invest in a project that 
raises average ROI, but does not yield a return equal to the company’s WACC. The result of 
this form of suboptimalization is that company capital is gradually allocated away from the 
most successful divisions to the least successful divisions (Merchant and Van der Stede 
2007). 
 
2.4  Residual income 
A measure that is supposed to combine the positive characteristics of both measures is 
residual income (RI). Over the past 2 decades it seems there has been increasing academic 
and practical interest in performance measures based on RI. This increased interest may 
be attributed to the New York consulting firm Stern Stewart & Co., that advocates a 
specific form32 of RI called economic value added (EVA) (Stewart 1991). 
                                             
32 Various other authors, as well as consulting firms have introduced slightly adjusted versions of RI, but EVA is 
the best known. These other adjusted versions of RI are cash-flow return on investments (CFROI) by Holt Value 
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The concept of RI has been introduced as early as 1890, by Alfred Marshall (Bouwens and 
Van Lent 2000), who defined it as net income minus a capital charge.  
In short, ROI is calculated by deducting from operating profit a charge on all capital 
employed. Schematically this looks like this (Bouwens and Speklé 2007): 
 
 
  Sales revenue 
-/-  Costs of operational activities 
-/-  Financing costs (Cost of capital x Capital employed) 
=  Residual income 
 
 
 
 
The result is a measure that takes into account the various areas that affect value: 
finance, investment and operational decisions are brought into one measure (Bouwens and 
Speklé 2007). Operational decisions surface in the profit part of the measure, investment 
and financing decisions in the cost of capital and the size of total assets parts. Managers’ 
decisions are thus directed to asset deployment (for example by increasing profits) and 
asset commitment (for example by decreasing the risk associated with the assets in place 
and by timing and determining the size of investments) (Stewart 1991). 
RI is supposed to combine the advantages of market- and accounting based performance 
measures. O’Hanlon and Peasnell (1998) show that discounted RI valuation yields the same 
results as discounted cash flow valuation. Since it has long been acknowledged stock 
markets base their value judgments on expected discounted cash flows, it would be logical 
to assume the market value of a firm and it’s RI are closely related (Bouwens and Speklé 
2007). The biggest advantage of RI-based measures over market-based measures of 
performance would then be that RI is less affected by external factors, and thus less noisy 
than stock prices. In addition, RI is more sensitive to managerial actions (Bouwens and 
Speklé 2007). 
These advantages, however are not specific to RI-based measures of performance 
(Bouwens and Speklé 2007). Other accounting-based measures, such as net income or 
return on assets, can be applied in the same situations. 
Proponents of RI type of measures claim RI, unlike traditional earnings, is closely aligned 
with the true value created by a company. Therefore, rewarding managers on the basis of 
this measure should best align manager and stockholder interests. The reasoning behind 
this is based on the age-old paradigm that a company creates wealth if it earns more than 
it’s cost of capital (debt and equity) (Biddle et al. 1997). Easton et al. (1992), however, 
provide convincing evidence that, especially over longer periods in time, accounting 
earnings and market value are related. Additionally, Biddle et al. (1997) show that RI and 
EVA are worse predictors of stock returns than traditional measures such as net income. 
 
 
3.  Hypothesis development 
 
3.1  Behavioral consequences of RI adoption 
The question raised by these findings is then why RI is still being used so widely. I can think 
of two possible explanations for this non-decreasing popularity: (1) companies aren’t 
                                                                                                                                           
Associates, Total Business Return by Boston Consulting Group, Economic Profit by McKinsey & Co. And 
Shareholder Value Added by LEK/Alcar (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007). 
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aware of the lack of information content of RI-based measures, or (2) other motives lead 
companies to adopt RI.  
Assuming organizations act rational, I reject the first explanation. I do not find it 
conceivable that firms (or in this case, compensation committees) choose to use RI/EVA 
based on the proclaimed correlation between RI and stockholder returns when an 
extensive list of literature exists on the absence of this relation (Easton et al. 1992; Biddle 
et al. 1997). This implies RI/EVA is adopted for reasons other than the proclaimed 
information content. Again, I consider two different reasons: (1) the somewhat cynical 
explanation of copycat-behavior and consultant-influence, and; (2) RI offers advantages 
other than the claimed informativeness on stockholder returns. 
Again, from the assumption of a rational firm, the first reason is rejected, implying RI has 
advantages we haven’t discussed before. This reason, I claim, lies in the behavior RI 
induces from managers. 
Wallace (1997) is one of the scarce researchers to examine management behavior after RI 
adoption. His findings support the adage ‘what you measure is what you get’. Firms 
adopting RI-based incentives for top managers increase RI relative to non-adopting firms. 
Furthermore, they decrease investments, increase divestments, increase payouts to 
shareholders, and increase asset turnover. These are all actions consistent with the strong 
rate of return discipline associated with RI. 
Balachandran (2006) extends the previous research by adding the factor of prior 
performance measures. His findings support Wallace’s (1997) investment-oriented 
conclusions, but only for firms who switched from earnings-based incentives to RI-based 
incentives. His findings show weak evidence that firms switching from ROI to RI actually 
increase investments. 
 
3.2  The value-based management framework 
Increasing interest in value-enhancing performance measures such as RI and EVA has led 
Ittner and Larcker (2001) to incorporate these measures into a value based management 
(VBM) framework. The idea behind this framework is to combine different aspects of 
management accounting (such as activity based costing and balanced scorecards) into an 
integrated framework to measure and manage businesses in the current perspective of 
creating superior long-term shareholder value. 
The six sequential steps of Ittner and Larcker’s (2001) VBM framework are the following: 
1. Choosing specific internal objectives that lead to shareholder value enhancement. 
2. Selecting strategies and organizational designs consistent with the achievement 
of the chosen objectives. 
3. Identifying the specific performance variables, or ‘‘value drivers’’, that actually create 
value in the business given the organization’s strategies and organizational design. 
4. Developing action plans, selecting performance measures, and setting targets based on 
the priorities identified in the value driver analysis. 
5. Evaluating the success of action plans and conducting organizational and managerial 
performance evaluations. 
6. Assessing the ongoing validity of the organization’s internal objectives, strategies, 
plans, and control systems in light of current results, and modifying them as required. 
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Over the years, researchers and consultants have placed RI/EVA in the first of these six 
steps: RI being the primary indicator for shareholder value enhancement (Malmi and 
Ikäheimo 2003). Placing RI at the top of the VBM framework implies it is the measure that 
best reflects long-term shareholder value enhancement. As we have seen earlier, however, 
this assumption appears to be false. RI and EVA do not seem to correlate with stockholder 
returns as well as is often claimed (Biddle et al. 1997). 
If RI, however, is adopted for the management-behavioral changes it is supposed to bring, I 
argue they do not belong at the top of the Ittner and Larcker (2001) VBM framework, but 
should be treated as ‘just another’ performance measure belonging to step three and 
below. RI-based measures should, then, be treated similar to other performance 
measurement systems (PMS’) such as the balanced scorecard or regular accounting 
(earnings-)based compensation. 
Taking another look at the VBM framework, we see strategic decision-making taking up the 
second step of the VBM sequence. Should RI-based performance measures belong at the 
top of the framework, as is usually argued (Malmi and Ikäheimo 2003), RI adoption should 
not be affected by corporate strategy. I argue, however, that RI/EVA should take it’s place 
among regular performance measures in step three and four. Following this line of 
reasoning, strategy should be a determinant in the choice whether or not to adopt RI-
based performance measures. 
 
3.3  Strategy typology 
In this research I use the strategy typology adapted from Miles and Snow (Miles et al. 
1978). Miles and Snow distinguish between three strategic types of organizations: 
defenders, analyzers and prospectors. Defenders operate in relatively stable product 
areas, offer more limited products than competitors, and compete through cost 
leadership, quality, and service. 
They engage in little product/market development. Prospectors, on the other hand, 
compete through new products and market development. Product lines change over time 
and this type of firm is constantly seeking new market opportunities. Analyzers are an 
intermediate hybrid, combining parts of both defender and prospector strategies (Simons 
1987). This spectrum from defender to prospector exhibits similar characteristics identified 
by other researchers. 
 
3.4  Hypothesis development 
When casting our minds back to Wallace’s (1997) findings concerning behavioral 
consequences of RI adoption, I find these findings to be intuitively misaligned with 
prospector-types of strategies. Furthermore, previous research on the relative 
informativeness value of performance measures have shown that companies (Ittner et al. 
1997) and business units (Govindarajan and Gupta 1985) following a prospector strategy 
are less likely to be evaluated by means of financial measures. 
My explanation for this hypothesis stems from an informativeness perspective. For (owners 
of) firms following a prospector strategy, efficient asset utilization is not a primary 
concern. Since RI is a measure with a strong focus on tight asset management, I consider RI 
to be a less informative measure for owners of prospector firms than for those of defender 
firms.  
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Formally put, my research hypothesis reads as follows: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms characterized as following a prospector strategy are less likely 
to adopt RI-based compensation for their top executives than firms characterized as 
following a defender strategy. 
 
 
4.  Research method 
 
4.1  Sample selection 
The sample in this study consists of 40 residual income-based compensation adopters and 
40 matched control firms. Strategy scores, as well as three control variables are computed 
for each of these 80 firms. Data from the five years prior to adoption is used to calculate 
average scores per firm (400 firm-year observations). This method of matching each 
adopting firm with one matched control firm is the same as that used by other studies 
examining determinants of certain management control systems adoptions (Wallace 1997; 
Kleiman 1999; Said et al. 2003; Balachandran 2006). 
Adopters of residual income-based incentives are defined as firms that use a residual 
income-based measure as their primary measure for annual cash bonuses to named 
executives33.  
The method by which adopters were identified involved extensive searches through proxy 
statements contained in the LexisNexis® Academic database. This method was 
appropriated from Ittner et al. (1997), who use the same method to identify firms using 
non-financial performance measures for executive compensation. The searches were 
performed using the keywords ‘economic value added’, ‘economic profit’ and ‘residual 
income’. 
After having finalized the adopter identification process at 40 firms, each of these firms 
were individually matched on the basis of standard industry classification (SIC) code 
followed by total assets. 
 
Table 4.1    
Definitive sample of adopting firms and matched control firms 
Year of 
adoption SIC # Adopting firm SIC # Control firm 
     
1995 3841 Bard, C.R. Inc. 3841 United States Surgical Corp.
1995 3826 Beckman Instruments Inc. 3826 Millipore Corp. 
1995 3600 Emerson Electric Co. 3674 Texas Instruments Inc. 
1995 4911 IPALCO Enterprises Inc. 4911 KU Energy Corp. 
1995 2711 Knight-Ridder Inc. 2711 Tribune Co. 
1995 3571 
Sequent Computer Systems 
Inc. 3571 Stratus Computer Inc. 
                                             
33 Named executives are a firm’s five most highly paid executives. Firms are required to disclose the names and 
total compensation values from these managers in their proxy statements (Balachandran 2006). 
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1996 2520 Kimball International 2531 BE Aerospace Inc. 
1996 3350 Olin Corp. 3311 Allegheny Technologies Inc. 
1996 1400 Vulcan Materials Co. 1400 English China Clays Plc. 
1996 3350 Tredegar Corp. 3350 Oregon Metallurgical Corp. 
1996 3140 K-Swiss Inc. 3140 Barry (R G) Corp. 
1996 2911 Quaker State 2911 Tesoro Corp. 
1996 3825 Tektronix 3825 Teradyne Inc. 
1996 3661 ADC Telecommunications 3661 Tellabs Inc. 
1996 3826 Hach Co. 3825 LTX Corp. 
1996 4213 KLLM Transport 4213 Heartland Express Inc. 
1996 2750 Donnelley & Sons 2750 Quebecor Inc. 
1996 2761 
New England Business 
Services 2761 Ennis Inc. 
1997 2834 Bausch & Lomb Inc. 2834 Alza Corp. 
1997 2520 Miller-Herman Inc. 2510 La-Z-Boy Inc. 
1997 7510 Ryder System Inc. 7510 Rollins Truck Leasing 
1997 7359 Xtra Corp. 7359 Weatherford Enterra Inc. 
1997 4955 Safety Kleen Systems Inc. 4955 OHM Corp. 
1998 4931 Montana Power Co. 4931 Allete Inc. 
1998 2750 Banta Corp. 2750 Paxar Corp. 
1998 3861 Eastman Kodak Co. 3861 Fujifilm Holdings Corp. 
1998 2540 Knape & Vogt MFG Co. 2540 Interlake Corp. 
1998 3310 National-Standard Co. 3310 Steel Technologies Inc. 
1998 5311 J C Penney Co. 5311 Macy's Inc. 
1998 3555 Baldwin Technology Co. 3560 Zebra Technologies Corp. 
1999 3612 SPX Corp. 3674 LSI Corp. 
2000 3721 Boeing Co. 3720 United Technologies Corp. 
2000 5661 Genesco Inc. 5661 Finish Line Inc. 
2000 3743 Trinity Industries 3743 Wabtec Corp. 
2000 6141 Credit Acceptance Corp. 6159 Financial Federal Corp 
2000 2670 Lydall 2670 Nashua Corp. 
2001 5093 Schnitzer Steel 5093 Newpark Resources Inc. 
2002 3390 Harsco Corp. 3312 Carpenter Technology Corp.
2004 7830 Marcus Corp. 7841 Hollywood Entertainment 
Corp. 
2005 2670 Playtex Products 2670 Cenveo Inc. 
 
 
I control for industry effects because prior research shows RI-systems are heavily 
concentrated in the manufacturing industry (Kleiman 1999). Industry is therefore 
considered to be of influence in the decision to adopt RI-based compensation.  
Size is controlled for because larger firms are considered more likely to be aware of 
stockholders’ expectations regarding return on equity, and are therefore considered more 
likely to adopt RI-based executive compensation. Firm size is measured by total assets. 
The definitive sample of adopting firms and matched peers is shown in table 4.1. 
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4.2  Variables 
Filling in the independent and control variables was the next step in acquiring the data 
needed for this research. For that I used the Compustat and Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) databases. Compustat was used to obtain the relevant information 
from financial statements of the sample firms. CRSP was used to calculate the abnormal 
returns, in order to be able to determine the correlation between historical abnormal 
returns and historical residual incomes of the sampled firms. 
 
4.2.1  Strategy 
In order to measure whether strategy is a determinant in the choice to adopt residual 
income, a strategy score is computed. Following Ittner et al. (1997), I use three ratios to 
proxy for strategy: Research and Development (R&D) expenditures-to-sales, market-to-
book-assets and employees-to-sales. I then aggregate these ratios into one strategy score 
per firm observation in which each ratio is weighted equally. I do this by calculating the 
average of the (equally weighted) individual factors. 
The ratio of R&D expenditures to sales is a measure for a firm’s tendency to search for 
new products. Because prospector firms are involved in more innovative actions, they are 
expected to spend more on R&D than defender firms (Hambrick 1983). 
According to Adam and Goyal (2008), the market-to-book assets ratio is the best proxy for 
growth or investment opportunities. Since prospector firms are considered to have better 
growth opportunities than defender firms, their market-to-book assets ratio should be 
higher (Said et al. 2003). 
The employees-to-sales ratio is included because defender firms are highly efficiency-
orientated. Therefore, they are assumed to have less employees per dollar of sales (Ittner 
et al. 1997). 
It was important to be as sure as possible that the way by which the strategy score was 
computed did not influence the results. I used a pragmatic approach to verify this, namely 
by computing the strategy score in different ways and checking whether my results 
changed. This did not appear to be the case. 
 
4.3  Control variables 
In addition to controlling for industry and size effects by matching firms, three control 
variables are added to the regression model: prior RI performance, leverage and the 
correlation between prior five-year residual income and prior five-year abnormal 
stockholder returns. 
The first control variable concerns prior RI performance. Wallace (1997) finds that the 
adage ‘what you get is what you measure and reward’ holds with RI-based compensation. 
Firms adopting RI-based measures significantly improve their RI compared to a matched 
sample of firms that don’t adopt RI-systems. Assuming firms are aware of this, low RI 
performance could be a motive to adopt RI-based compensation. Therefore, prior RI 
performance is expected to be negatively associated with RI adoption. 
Leverage, measured as total debt divided by total assets, is expected to be negatively 
associated with the likelihood of RI adoption. For more highly leveraged firms, a larger 
fraction of capital costs consist of interest payments. This decreases the need for an 
additional charge on equity (Garvey and Milbourn 2000).  
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Jensen (1989) furthermore argues a high level of debt provides its own incentives to 
manage capital efficiently as the high interest payments can be seen as a forced way of 
distributing (free) cash flow. This counteracts managers’ incentives to retain too large a 
proportion of free cash flow, which is also one of the effects of a RI adoption (Wallace 
1997). More highly leveraged firms would therefore not benefit from RI adoption as much 
as less highly leveraged firms would. 
Garvey and Milbourn (2000) find that a firm’s decision to adopt an EVA incentive system is 
contingent on the degree to which EVA explains stock prices (relative information 
content). Assuming this finding holds for the more general RI measure as well, I include a 
measure for relative information content in the regression model computed as the 
correlation between residual income and abnormal stock returns in the five years prior to 
RI adoption.  
 
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1  Preliminary tests 
Before testing whether the hypothesis can be accepted or rejected, I conduct two 
preliminary analyses. The first is to see whether my method of using three ratios to 
measure strategy is correct, the second is to exclude outliers in my sample. 
One of the underlying assumptions in my research is that the three ratios I use to measure 
strategy actually measure strategy. Although the same method has been used by various 
researchers in the past (Ittner et al. 1997; Said et al. 2003), I perform a factor analysis test 
to see how the three individual ratios are correlated. If all three ratios measure the same 
thing (strategy), their scores should be closely related.  
The correlation matrix of the individual strategy scores is shown in table 5.1. The findings 
indicate employees-to-sales does not correlate well with the other two ratios. In fact, the 
correlation is negative, although the results are not significant. The correlation between 
R&D expenditures-to-sales and market-to-book-assets ratios is stronger, and proves 
significant at the .000 level. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 Strategy score correlation matrix 
  R&D / Sales Market to book assets Employees / Sales 
R&D / Sales 1.000 .556 -.177 
Market to book assets  1.000 -.143 
Correlation 
Employees / Sales   1.000 
R&D / Sales - .000 .123 
Market to book assets  - .174 
Sig.  
(1-tailed) 
Employees / Sales   - 
 
 
These results are confirmed by the principle component analysis shown in table 5.2. Two 
components are extracted, as opposed to the hypothesized one component: strategy. The 
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first component is well correlated with R&D-to-sales and market-to-book-assets, whereas 
the second component is based mainly on a high correlation with employees-to-sales. 
The relevant question, then, is what these results mean for my research. If we assume the 
first component (the component closely related to R&D-to-sales and market-to-book-
assets) is corporate strategy, apparently employees-to-sales measures something else. 
With this in mind, I decide to run my tests two times: one time including the employees-
to-sales ratio and one time excluding it. 
 
 
Table 5.2 Strategy score component matrixa 
 Component 
 1 2 
R&D / Sales .858 .195 
Market to book assets .846 .260 
Employees / Sales -.429 .903 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted.  
 
As is the case in linear regression models, logistic regression can be significantly influenced 
by outliers. To prevent these outliers from distorting my results I chose to exclude them 
from the sample. A complicating factor specific to my type of research is the fact that my 
sample consists of 40 matched firm couples. Outliers should therefore not be identified by 
means of analysis of the absolute numbers (strategy scores), but as the relative difference 
between the strategy scores of two matched firms. 
This difference is calculated by measuring the strategy score of the adopter firm as a 
percentage of the strategy score of it’s matched control firm. This way I identify outliers 
by couple instead of by firm. Considering the difference in characteristics between the 
strategy scores calculated with and without employees-to-sales ratios, outliers are 
determined separately. 
Strategy scores calculated including employees-to-sales ratios are less spread out than 
those excluding employees-to-sales. A smaller difference between two matched firms is 
therefore tolerated for the analysis including employees-to-sales than for the analysis 
without employees-to-sales. For the former, outliers are defined as firm couples for which 
the adopter firm has a strategy score that is either less than 40%, or more than 250% (two 
and a half times in both directions) of the strategy score of it’s matched peer. Six firm 
couples, or twelve firms are identified as outliers. In the analysis excluding employees-to-
sales the percentages are at 25% and 400% (four times in both directions). Here, eight firm 
couples, or sixteen firms are identified as outliers. 
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics for compounded strategy scores 
  Full sample Adopting firms Control firms 
Strategy score Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Median Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Median Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Median
1.38 .91 1.19 1.28 .64 1.22 1.49 1.11 1.12 Including 
employees-to-
sales N = 68 N = 34 N = 34 
1.34 1.40 0.88 1.15 .94 0.89 1.52 1.73 0.85 Excluding 
employees-to-
sales N = 64 N = 32 N = 32 
Control Variables 
(N = 80) 
     
Prior RI 
performance 
-42.26 136.04 -15.73 -32.56 135.16 -15.07 -51.97 137.93 -16.44 
Leverage 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.22 0.29 0.23 0.27 
RI - Stock 
price 
correlation 
0.24 0.51 0.34 0.23 0.55 0.34 0.25 0.48 0.32 
The outlier identification process described before has resulted in the descriptive statistics 
presented in table 5.3. 
 
5.2  Binary logistic regression 
The most important test used to test the relation between RI adoption and firm strategy is 
the binary logistic regression. Logistic regression is used to predict the likelihood of the 
occurrence of an event by fitting the data in a logistic curve34. Binary (or binominal) 
logistic regression is used when the dependent variable is dichotomous, as is the case in 
this study. The idea to use this technique came from reading research comparable to mine 
(Garvey and Milbourn 2000; Said et al. 2003; Hogan and Lewis 2005). 
                                             
34 Source: Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logistic_regression (Accessed on July 19, 2008). 
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Table 5.4 Binary logistic regressions for compounded strategy scores 
 Predicted 
sign 
Strategy including 
employees-to-sales ratio 
Strategy excluding 
employees-to-sales ratio 
      
  
Coefficien
t 
Odds ratio Coefficient Odds ratio 
-.388 .678 -.289 .749 
Strategy - 
(.209) (.184) 
      
Control variables      
.001 1.001 .001 1.001 Prior RI 
performance 
- 
(.469) (.487) 
-1.440 .237 -1.349 .260 
Leverage - 
(.287) (.337) 
-.403 .669 -.052 .949 RI – Stock price 
correlation 
+ 
(.423) (.919) 
1.084 2.956 .791 2.206 
Constant  
(.112) (.183) 
    
Chi-square  
3.590 
(.464) 
2.720 
(.606) 
Pseudo R-square 
(Nagelkerke) 
 .069 .055 
Sample size  68 64 
*, **, *** Significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
P-values between brackets. 
For an extensive discussion of the included variables see chapter four. 
 
The results, displayed in table 5.4, generally suggest the model is weak. The chi-square 
goodness-of-fit results indicate the step to include all four variables (from the constant-
only model) is not justified at a significant level (indicated by a p-value lower than .05)35. 
The Nagelkerke pseudo R-squared measures of 6.9% and 5.5% also indicate weak models. 
Nagelkerke’s R-square is comparable to the R-square in a linear regression model. It ranges 
from 0 to 1 and loosely indicates the percentage in the dependent variable explained by 
the four independent variables (Pelsmacker, De and Van Kenhove 2006).  
When looking at the results on the individual variable level, the image of a weak model 
persists. Although the direction of the strategy coefficients is negative as predicted, these 
coefficients are significant for neither of the two strategy constructs.  
Interpretation of the logistic coefficients is difficult. Therefore I include the odds ratio in 
table 5.4. Odds ratios are computed as the natural log base, e, to the exponent, b, where 
b is the logistic coefficient36. What remains after this calculation is the factor by which the 
                                             
35 Source: David Garson: Logistic Regression. http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logistic.htm 
(Accessed on July 19, 2008). 
36 Idem. 
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likelihood of the occurrence of the dependent variable changes with a single-unit change 
in the independent variable. For example, if strategy (excluding employees-to-sales) would 
increase by one unit, the likelihood of the firm being an adopter firm decreases by the 
factor .749. Thus, the lower the odds ratio, the more likely a firm is to be a non-adopter 
when the strategy score increases by one. In this example, an increase of one in the 
strategy score would lower the odds of that firm to adopt RI by 25.1% (1 - .749). 
 
 
Table 5.5 Wilcoxon signed-rank test for compounded strategy scores 
Control firm strategy – Adopter firm strategy 
Strategy including employees-to-sales 
(n = 34*) 
Strategy excluding employees-to-sales 
(n = 32*) 
Z P-value Z P-value 
-.932 .351 -.374 .708 
* Defined as firm couples 
 
 
5.3  Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
I then perform a test to compare medians of the adopting and non-adopting sample. 
Because the strategy scores in my sample are not normally distributed, I have to turn to 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank nonparametric test (Aczel and Sounderpandian 2002). The 
Wilcoxon test does not assume a normally distributed sample is only slightly weaker than 
the t-test, which is normally used when comparing the means or medians of two samples 
(Aczel and Sounderpandian 2002). It is often used when comparing two populations with 
paired observations. The test assesses the null hypothesis that the medians of two 
populations do not differ37. 
Results from the Wilcoxon test are summed up in table 5.6. The results are, like the binary 
logistic regression, insignificant. The medians of the two populations can not be concluded 
to differ. 
 
 
6.  Discussion 
 
6.1  Summary 
This study aims to answer the question whether the choice to adopt RI is an endogenous 
one in general, and whether corporate strategy is a factor affecting this choice in 
particular. The motivation behind this research question primarily came from a study by 
Wallace (1997), who found firms adopting RI noticed observable behavioral effects of this 
adoption. RI adopters seemed to (1) decrease investments, (2) increase divestments, (3) 
increase payouts to shareholders, and (4) increase asset turnover in the years following RI 
adoption, compared to a matched sample of firms who did not adopt RI. I argue from an 
informativeness point of view these behavioral consequences fit a defender-type strategy 
better than a prospector-type strategy. 
                                             
37 Source: David Garson: Significance Tests for Two Dependent Samples: McNemar, Marginal Homogeneity, Sign, 
and Wilcoxon Tests. http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/mcnemar.htm (Accessed on July 21, 2008). 
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The research methodology used in this study is equal to that used in comparable research 
(Wallace 1997; Ittner et al. 1997; Kleiman 1999; Said et al. 2003). From the LexisNexis® 
proxy statement database I identify 40 firms that have adopted RI as their primary 
measure of performance for top executives in the past 13 years. These firms are matched 
to an equally large sample of 40 peer firms. These matches are based on standard industry 
classification (SIC) code, and on total assets, which I use to proxy for firm size. 
For these 80 firms, I compute a strategy score as an equally-weighed average of three 
ratios, measured over the five years prior to RI adoption: (1) R&D expenditures-to-sales, 
(2) market-to-book-assets, and (3) employees-to-sales. These strategy scores form a 
continuum ranging from defenders (low scores) to prospectors (high scores). Additionally, 
three control variables are measured which are hypothesized to influence the choice to 
adopt RI. Each of these are also measured as an average over the five year prior to RI 
adoption: (1) prior RI performance, (2) leverage, and (3) the correlation between prior RI’s 
and prior abnormal stock returns. All financial data used in this study was obtained through 
the Compustat North-America annual database. 
After taking a closer look at the strategy construct, I had to conclude employees-to-sales 
might be measuring something different than the other two ratios do. Therefore, all tests 
are conducted twice: one time with a strategy score as explained earlier, and one time 
with a strategy score excluding the employees-to-sales ratio. The empirical results for both 
of these models show the image of a weak model, with no significant results any of the 
individual variables. 
 
6.2  Conclusions 
The results in this research ask for an explanation, of which I will present a couple here. 
Despite the fact that my hypothesis cannot be confirmed by my findings, I do not believe a 
conclusion is appropriate that states no relation exists between corporate strategy and RI 
adoption. A very conservative outlier policy has significantly reduced my sample size38. It is 
my belief that a larger sample size would have yielded results on which stronger 
conclusions could have been drawn. 
Another possible explanation can be found in the assumptions I made in this study. One of 
these assumptions is that firms act rational. I mean by this that I assume firms that adopt 
RI do not do this for it’s proclaimed (and proved wrong, Biddle et al. 1997) correlation with 
stock prices. This assumption is critical in the argumentation there are other advantages of 
adopting RI, mainly in the area of behavioral consequences. 
After seeing the results of this study, we can question whether my assumption of the 
rational firm was correct. The absence of a significant relation between corporate strategy 
and the choice to adopt RI can be explained if firms do adopt RI for the expected 
correlation with stock returns. Firms may also choose to adopt RI for other non-rational 
reasons such as imitational reasons or because of the influence of consultants. Behavior of 
imitation would also explain the strong wave-like structure of RI adopters in my sample. RI 
adoption seems to decrease strongly in the later years of my sample (after 2000). 
Malmi and Ikäheimo (2003) confirm in a field study that increasing shareholder value is 
often mentioned as the primary motive for RI adoption. Nonetheless, contrary to my 
                                             
38 From n = 80 to n = 68 (n = 64 for the model excluding employees-to-sales). A reduction of 15% (20%). 
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hypothesis, they observe that firms adopt RI to foster two different strategic orientations. 
Two of the six firms they investigated considered themselves to follow a growth strategy, 
comparable to the prospector strategy in my study. These firms see RI as an aid in their 
creation of value through growth. For the other four firms, efficient asset utilization was 
mentioned as the primary motive for RI adoption. These findings are inconsistent with my 
hypothesis that growth firms do not benefit from RI adoption. 
Remarkably, both growth firms in the Malmi and Ikäheimo (2003) study explicitly state that 
they have switched to RI after having experienced the drawbacks of ROI as they are 
discussed in paragraph 2.3 of this paper. This observation is consistent with the results of a 
study by Balachandran (2006), who discovered firms switching from ROI to RI showed a 
different change in managerial behavior than firms switching from earnings-based 
measures to RI. Whereas Wallace (1997) finds all firms adopting RI generally increase focus 
on efficient asset utilization, Balachandran (2006) finds this observation does not hold for 
firms switching from ROI-type of measures to RI. 
The combination of these three studies gives rise to a new explanation for the lack of 
significant results in my study. I hypothesize, inspired by the statements of the two growth 
firms in the Malmi and Ikäheimo (2003) study, that the limitations of using ROI as a 
performance measure are much more relevant for growth (prospector) firms than for firms 
emphasizing efficient asset utilization (defender firms). Therefore I mainly expect 
prospector firms to switch from ROI to RI. Had I had the chance to redo my research, I 
would have altered my hypothesis to incorporate the effect of previous performance 
measures. The hypothesis would, then, look more like this: “Prospector firms are more 
likely to make the switch from ROI to RI measures than are defender firms”. 
With hindsight we can conclude that in Wallace’s (1997) sample, firms switching from ROI 
to RI were under-represented compared to firms switching from earnings-based measures 
to RI. If my reformulated hypothesis is confirmed, we can also say prospector firms were 
under-represented in Wallace’s (1997) sample. In other words: Wallace’s (1997) findings 
may turn out to be contingent on strategy. 
 
6.3  Limitations 
It is important to note that there are limitations to the results of this research. The first 
being the way in which strategy is measured. Although the method is used quite widely 
among management accounting researchers, it remains an approximation of strategy. 
There may furthermore be a difference in realized and intended strategies (Snow and 
Hambrick; 1980), with the method used by me only measuring realized strategy.  
This research furthermore does not fully take into account the weight of the RI-system 
incentives relative to total compensation. Although I explicitly selected only those 
companies for which RI is the primary performance measure, the proportion of RI 
incentives to total compensation isn’t taken into account. One might argue any 
consideration (including strategy), when adopting a RI-based incentive system, is more 
critically assessed when larger proportions of executives’ compensations depend on the 
measure. The main motive behind the choice not to include RI incentive’s proportions of 
total compensation into account is that total compensation is difficult to extract from 
firms’ external reports. Especially the part of the compensation package that is paid in 
stock options is hard to express in dollar amounts. 
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6.4  Directions for future research 
My research gives rise to a number of directions for future research. The low explanatory 
power of the models indicate either endogenous factors are missing, or RI adoption is not 
endogenous at all. Future research can be conducted to see whether RI adoption is an 
endogenous choice and sequentially which are the factors that affect the decision to adopt 
RI. My suggestion would be to conduct exploratory research on firms’ motives behind RI 
adoption. Potential imitational behavior should not be ignored in these studies. 
Following the line of reasoning in the concluding paragraph of this chapter, I have formed 
a new (and improved) hypothesis concerning the endogenous character of RI adoption. I 
argue firms that switch from ROI to RI are more likely to be identifiable as following a 
prospector strategy than as following a defender strategy. Unfortunately the process of 
writing a master thesis does not allow me to actually conduct this research. Nonetheless, I 
believe my research has contributed to existing RI adoption literature in that it forms a 
part of the ‘academic circle’, hoping my results will open doors for future research to 
refine this research. 
In the process of identifying RI adopters I experienced that only a remarkably small number 
of firms have adopted RI in the recent years. The list of adopters I identified furthermore 
suggests a negative trend of RI adoption can be noticed. Future studies can try to 
concretize this preliminary observation and find an explanation for this apparent 
decreasing practical interest in RI-based compensation systems. This can, again, be linked 
with possible behavior of imitation. 
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